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A myth to kill a myth? 
On McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars’ Empiricism and the philosophy of mind
As is  well  known,  in  Empiricism and  the  Philosophy of  Mind  (henceforth  EPM) 
Sellars introduces two myths: the Myth of the Given and the myth of Jones. The former is 
a deeply rooted epistemological picture, while the latter is a thought experiment in the 
philosophy of mind. In the  incipit  of the last paragraph of  EPM (§ 63) Sellars tells us in 
generic and metaphoric terms that the myth of Jones is an important ingredient in his 
overall  argument against epistemological foundationalism: “I  have used a myth to kill  a 
myth – the Myth of the Given”. According to McDowell  (2009a; 2009b; 2010), in  EPM 
(especially in Sellars' account of non-inferential knowledge) the myth of Jones has a more 
specific purpose, namely,  to complete the account of  experience that Sellars needs to 
argue against traditional empiricism (that is, one of the most widespread forms of the Myth 
of the Given): on McDowell’s view the myth of Jones should explain how to conceive of 
non-inferentially knowable experiences as containing propositional  claims  (EPM  §§ 16, 
60). In this paper I argue that the myth of Jones does not succeed in providing such an 
account,  especially  on  McDowell's  own  terms:  assuming  McDowell’s  (2010) 
epistemological distinction between inferential and non-inferential knowledge, it turns out 
that  in  Sellars'  thought  experiment  perceptual  experiences  can  contain  propositional  
claims only at the price of being known inferentially rather than non-inferentially. Therefore, 
as I argue, McDowell’s Sellars is not successful in the rejection of traditional empiricism, 
for his anti-foundationalist argument is not in accordance with his own requirements. It is 
worth noting, however, that I wish to distinguish McDowell's Sellars from the “authentic” 
Wilfrid Sellars. My ultimate goal is to refute neither McDowell's own theoretical views on 
perception (insofar as they differ  from McDowell's interpretation of Sellars) nor Sellars' 
argument in  EPM against the Myth of the Given, but rather McDowell's interpretation of 
Sellars' attack on traditional empiricism.
I.Traditional empiricism
In EPM one of the forms taken by the Myth of the Given, abstractly formulated, is
the idea that there is, indeed must be, a structure of particular matter of fact such 
that  … each  fact  can  not  only  be  non-inferentially  known  to  be  the  case,  but 
presupposes no other knowledge either of particular matter of fact, or of general 
truths; and (…) such that the non-inferential knowledge of facts belonging to this 
structure constitutes the ultimate court of appeals for all factual claims – particular 
and general – about the world (§ 32).
Sellars’ main goal in EPM is to argue that such a given structure cannot exist, for at 
least two of its features are incompatible with one another:  being known (though non-
inferentially), on the one hand, and being epistemically independent1, on the other hand. 
The  Myth  of  the  Given,  Sellars  claims  (EPM  §  38),  typically  characterizes  traditional  
empiricism,  a view (properly speaking, a cluster of views) according to which empirical 
knowledge has an ultimate foundation. Consider an observation report such as (1).
(1) This is green.
One’s uttering sentence (1) expresses one’s non-inferential knowledge  that that is  
green. According to traditional empiricism, such knowledge presupposes no knowledge of  
other matter of fact, whether particular or general. In part VIII of  EPM (viz. in §§ 32-38) 
Sellars rejects this conception of observation reports. 
A  second,  less  abstract  form  of  traditional  empiricism  is  the  idea  that  looks-
statements such as (2) are reports of given appearances, and consequently “come before” 
all other statements expressing knowledge (including observation reports such as (1)) both 
conceptually and in the order of explanation.
(2) This looks green to me.
Sellars writes that “while this idea has (…) been the most widespread form of the 
Myth, it is far from constituting its essence” (EPM § 10). He provides an account of looks-
statements such as (2) in part III of EPM (viz. in §§ 10-20). 
In  what  follows  I  will  reconstruct  John McDowell’s  authoritative  interpretation  of 
Sellars’ attack on the above mentioned empiricist forms of the Myth of the Given, and I will 
argue  that  McDowell’s  interpretation  of  Sellars’  argument  is  not  successful  against 
traditional  empiricism.  I  think  that  McDowell’s  exegesis  can  be  better  understood  if  
compared to an equally authoritative but alternative reading of Sellars on non-inferential  
knowledge, namely, Robert Brandom’s (though I do not wish to suggest that McDowell’s 
1 See deVries and Triplett (2000) for more details on such a notion.
interpretation  is  a  mere  response  to  Brandom).  Thus,  I  will  describe  and  compare 
McDowell’s and Brandom’s interpretations of Sellars’ account of non-inferential knowledge 
(expressed by statements such as (1) and (2)). I will not, however, be concerned with the  
overall debate between McDowell and Brandom on perception, which is basically centred 
on the questions whether perception is a social phenomenon and how perceived states of 
affairs can rationally constrain empirical thought2. Rather, I wish to use the comparison to 
argue that McDowell’s Sellars does not successfully challenge traditional empiricism.
My argument will run as follows. Preliminarily, I will briefly reconstruct Brandom’s 
attribution of a “two-ply account” of non-inferential knowledge to Sellars (section II). Then I 
will discuss two main reasons why McDowell disagrees with Brandom’s exegesis. First, 
Brandom's  Sellars  is  an  anti-empiricist  tout  court,  while  McDowell's  Sellars  is  a  non-
traditional  empiricist,  for  he  aims  to  replace  traditional  empiricism  with  a  reformed 
empiricism  (where  experience  still  has  the  role  of  yielding  non-inferential  knowledge) 
(section III). Secondly, Brandom's Sellars completes his argument against the Myth of the  
Given in the first part of EPM (before Ryleans and the genius Jones come on the scene),  
whereas McDowell's Sellars’ argument against traditional empiricism depends on the claim 
that non-inferentially known perceptual experiences have propositional content,  a claim 
which  in  turn  relies  on  the  myth  of  Jones  (section  IV).  I  will  subsequently  focus  on 
McDowell's view, according to which Brandom's attribution of a 'two-ply' account of non-
inferential knowledge to Sellars is not only wrong about Sellars but also deeply implausible 
in itself  (section V). Then I will  provide an exegesis of the  dénouement  of the myth of 
Jones  that  will  turn  out  to  be  more  sympathetic  to  Brandom's  interpretation  than  to  
McDowell's (section VI), and I will argue that Sellars’ thought experiment, considered as an 
argument  in  narrative  form,  is  a  bad  argument  by  McDowell’s  own  standards  (as  I  
reconstruct them in section V). I will conclude that since, by McDowell's own standards,  
the  myth  of  Jones  does  not  “kill”  the  (empiricist  forms  of  the)  Myth  of  the  Given, 
McDowell’s Sellars does not succeed in challenging traditional empiricism (section VIII).  
Let  me  emphasize,  however,  that  my  aim  in  this  paper  is  just  to  reject  McDowell’s 
interpretation of Sellars' argument against the Myth of the Given, but I do not wish to argue 
that Sellars' argument, however construed, is a failure. Thus, in the concluding section I 
will make this clearer by pointing out some differences between McDowell's Sellars and 
(what I take to be) the authentic Wilfrid Sellars (section IX).
2 See, for example, Macbeth (forthcoming). Rosenberg (2004a) also addresses all three authors discussed in this paper 
on  the  very  subject  of  non-inferential  knowledge.  Rosenberg  argues  that  Sellars'  strong  epistemic  internalism  is 
preferable in its essentials to both Brandom's and McDowell's alternatives. Rosenberg, however, just touches upon the 
myth of Jones but doesn't focus on it.  As far as I can see, the significance of the myth of Jones for the McDowell-
Brandom debate has become  clear only in  more recent  times (see, especially,  McDowell  2009a, 2009b,  2010 and 
Brandom 2010).
II. Brandom’s Sellars
According to Brandom (2002: 349-53), in EPM Sellars provides a two-ply account of 
observation reports such as (1); such an account gives the sufficient conditions of non-
inferential knowledge. For example, if one utters sentence (1) in the presence of a green 
object, then one's (true) utterance expresses non-inferential knowledge if the following two 
conditions are fulfilled. On the one hand, one's utterance is one's (behavioural) reliable  
response  to the stimulus given by the occurrence of the green object, in virtue of one's  
Reliable Differential Responsive Disposition (henceforth RDRD). On the other hand, one is 
able to justify one's statement, in virtue of one's capacity of participating in an inferentially-
articulated deontic practice. The former capacity (the RDRD) might be shared by a parrot 
or even by a conveniently built artifact, while the latter capacity (that is, the capacity of 
taking  up  a  position  in  the  game  of  giving  and  asking  for  reasons)  is  an  exclusive 
prerogative of the human species or, at least, of beings endowed with a language. 
Moreover,  Brandom’s  Sellars  applies,  mutatis  mutandis,  the  two-ply  account  of 
observation  reports  such  as  (1)  to  looks-statements  such  as  (2).  Asserting  the  latter,  
Brandom (2002: 356) claims, “is doing two things: first,  it is evincing the same usually 
reliable differential responsive disposition that in other circumstances results in the claim 
that something  is  green. But second, it is  withholding  the endorsement of the claim that 
something is green. In other words, it is doing something that agrees with an ordinary non-
inferential  report  of  green things on the first  component  of  Sellars’ two-ply account  of 
observation reports – sharing an RDRD – but disagrees with it on the second component,  
withholding endorsement instead of undertaking the commitment”.
To sum up, Brandom's exegesis is based on the following claim:
B(i): In EPM Sellars provides a two-ply account of observation reports such as (1) and of 
looks-statements such as (2): asserting both (1) and (2) requires RDRD + inferential 
capacity.  In  (1),  however,  such  a  capacity  is  exercised  by  undertaking  the 
commitment, while in (2) it is exercised by withholding endorsement.
Furthermore,  Brandom  (1997:  167-8)  regards  Sellars’  two-ply  account  of  non-
inferential knowledge as sufficient to achieve “one of the major tasks of the whole essay”, 
that  is,  “to  dismantle  empiricism”  (namely,  the  idea  that  empirical  knowledge  has  an 
ultimate foundation). For the occurrence of the second factor of the two-ply account (that  
is, the  inferential  capacity to take part in the game of giving and asking for reasons, a 
capacity that Brandom conceives of as itself not having a foundational structure) implies 
that one's non-inferential knowledge of something cannot be epistemically independent. It  
is  worth  noting  that  according  to  Brandom  such  an  anti-empiricist  task  is  already 
accomplished at § 45 of  EPM, three paragraphs  before  Sellars talks about our mythical 
Rylean ancestors and the genius Jones. Thus, Brandom's second exegetical claim is the 
following:
B(ii): Sellars (successfully) argues against the empiricist forms of the Myth of the Given in 
the  first  half  of  EPM.  Such  an  argument  is based  on  the  two-ply  account  of 
observation reports and looks-statements.
III. McDowell’s Sellars: the role of experience
McDowell  rejects B(i).  First  of  all,  he rejects Brandom’s interpretation of Sellars’ 
view  on  observation  reports  such  as  (1).  According  to  McDowell  (2009a:  225-6), 
Brandom's exegesis forgets that Sellars considers seeing that-things-are-so-and-so as a 
form  of  (perceptual)  experience.  Unlike  Brandom  (1997:  131-2),  who  regards  the 
occurrence of the term “empiricism” in the title of Sellars’ essay as somewhat misleading, 
McDowell (2009a: 221; 2009b: 6) emphasizes that Sellars does not intend to dispense 
with  empiricism  tout  court,  but  only  to  dispense  with  traditional  empiricism,  as 
characterized by the Cartesian Myth of the Given. According to McDowell's Sellars, what 
one knows non-inferentially (typically by perception) is, after all, something one encounters 
in experience; it is a bit of reality, whose sensible presence one is perceptually aware of.  
Against the Myth of the Given, McDowell's Sellars shows that seeing that-things-are-so-
and-so is not an epistemically independent experience, but nonetheless,  pace Brandom, 
he  thinks  that  it  is  a  piece  of  experience,  that  is,  in  McDowell’s  terms,  a  shaping  of 
“sensory consciousness” (2009a: 225)3.
If  one  followed  Brandom,  McDowell  argues  (2009a:  225),  one  would  think  that 
involvement  of  sensory consciousness in  our  acquisition of  perceptual  knowledge has 
nothing essential to do with the very idea of perceptual knowledge; rather, it is at best a 
contingent detail about the mechanism by which, in some cases, RDRDs operate when 
3 For a different criticism of Brandom's interpretation of Sellars’ account of looks-statements, see deVries and Coates 
(2009), section III.
certain  physical  objects  occur.  In  a  way,  sensory consciousness would  be like  neuro-
physiological details, which are causally relevant but not (so far)  constitutive  of the very 
concept  of  perceptual  knowledge.  McDowell  doesn't  think  that  the  idea  of  a  piece  of 
knowledge  based  on  RDRDs  (such  that  there  is  no  conceptual  role  left  for  sensory 
awareness) is inconsistent.  Rather,  he thinks that such an idea does not convey what 
Sellars means by “perceptual knowledge”, expressed by observation reports such as (1) 
(let alone by looks-statements such as (2))4.
McDowell focuses on  EPM § 38, where Sellars makes it clear what he rejects in 
traditional empiricism, a philosophical view that considers experience as the epistemically 
independent ground of all knowledge:
If I reject the framework of traditional empiricism, it is not because I want to say that 
empirical knowledge has no foundation. For to put it this way is to suggest that it is  
really  'empirical  knowledge  so-called',  and  to  put  it  in  a  box  with  rumors  and 
hoaxes. There is clearly some point to the picture of human knowledge as resting 
on  a  level  of  propositions  –  observation  reports  –  which  do  not  rest  on  other 
propositions in the same way as other propositions rest on them. 
Commenting these words, McDowell  argues that Sellars’ point against traditional 
empiricism is not that perceptual knowledge is not grounded in experience, but rather that  
perceptual  experience  is  neither  self-justified  nor  epistemically  independent.  In  fact, 
according  to  Sellars  (as  interpreted  by  McDowell)  “it  is  experience  that  yields  the 
knowledge  expressed  in  observation  reports”  such  as  (1)  (McDowell  2009a:  223). 
Assuming this interpretation of the role of experience in Sellars’ account of non-inferential  
knowledge, McDowell reconstructs traditional empiricism (=TE) along the following lines: 
(TE) One’s non-inferential knowledge of one’s own perceptual experiences is epistemically  
independent.
Accordingly,  McDowell’s  Sellars’  Argument  against  TE  (henceforth,  ATE)  is  the 
following:
(ATE)  One  non-inferentially  knows  one’s  own  perceptual  experiences,  which  have  
propositional  content.  But  one’s  knowledge  of  something  that  has  propositional  
content  cannot  be  epistemically  independent.  Hence,  one’s  non-inferential  
4 See McDowell (2010: 129-130).
knowledge  of  one’s  own  perceptual  experiences  cannot  be  epistemically  
independent, that is, TE is false.
Thus,  McDowell’s  Sellars  answers  the  question  “Does empirical  knowledge has 
foundation?”  with  a  qualified  “yes”,  an  answer  that  differs  from  both  the  traditional 
empiricist’s unqualified “yes” and Brandom’s Sellars’ straightforward “no”. In other words, 
McDowell’s  Sellars  aims  to  replace  traditional  empiricism  with  a  sort  of  reformed 
empiricism. According to McDowell (2009a: 223), however, both this replacement and ATE 
require a more detailed picture of experience, “explaining how it can yield non-inferential  
knowledge, but only in a way that presupposes other knowledge of matters of fact – in 
contrast  with  the  presupposition-free  knowledge-yielding  powers  that  experience  is 
credited with by traditional  empiricism”.  The required picture,  McDowell  claims, “is just 
what Sellars offers (…) in part III” of EPM, when he accounts for looks-statements such as 
(2)  (2009a:  223;  2010:  131).  Moreover,  contra  Brandom,  McDowell  emphasizes  that 
Sellars regards such statements as reports, that is, speech acts that report something. In 
EPM § 15 Sellars reckons that
there certainly seems to be something to the idea that the sentence 'This looks 
green to me now' has a reporting role. Indeed, it would seem to be essentially a 
report. But if so,  what does it report, if not a minimal objective fact, and if what it 
reports is not to be analyzed in terms of sense data?
According to McDowell, Sellars’ answer to this question simply is: “a (perceptual) 
experience”. For example, consider EPM § 16’: 
When I say 'X looks green to me now' I am reporting the fact that my experience is, 
so to speak, intrinsically, as an experience, indistinguishable from a veridical one of 
seeing that X is green. 
To sum up, against B(i) McDowell sets up the following claim:
McD(i): Sellars’ account of observation reports such as (1) and of looks-statements such 
as  (2)  is  not  (based  on)  Brandom's  two-ply  account.  For  Sellars’  reformed 
empiricism  agrees  with  traditional  empiricism  at  least  on  this:  after  all,  such 
statements are grounded5 on perceptual experiences (though according to Sellars’ 
non-traditional  empiricism  such  experiences  are  propositionally  contentful  and 
5 See section IX below for more details on the notion of a ground.
consequently cannot be epistemically independent).
IV. McDowell’s Sellars: the promissory note and the myth of Jones
According to McDowell, even in the eyes of Sellars the first part of EPM (let alone 
§§ 10-20 and §§ 32-38) is not sufficient to support either the conclusion of ATE or his  
reformed empiricism. That’s why McDowell rejects B(ii). He acknowledges, with Brandom, 
that according to Sellars – whatever the phrase “knowing that-p non-inferentially” means – 
non-inferential pieces of knowledge are not epistemically independent and self-justified. 
But McDowell  emphasizes,  contra  Brandom, what Sellars makes it clear in  EPM  § 16: 
strictly speaking, it is not entirely clear either  what it means  that perceptual experiences 
contain  propositional  claims,  or  whether  it  is  possible  that  one non-inferentially knows 
one’s propositionally contentful perceptual experiences. That's why Sellars must endorse a 
promissory note. He confesses (EPM § 16):
I realize that by speaking of experiences as containing propositional claims, I may 
seem to be knocking at closed doors. I ask the reader to bear with me, however, as 
the justification of this way of talking is one of my major aims. If I am permitted to 
issue  this  verbal  currency  now,  I  hope  to  put  it  on  the  gold  standard  before 
concluding the argument.
According to McDowell, Sellars delivers on the promissory note in EPM § 60, that is, 
at  the  end  of  the  first  phase  of  the  myth  of  Jones  (2009a:  223)6,  the  piece  of 
"anthropological science fiction" (EPM § 48) that Sellars builds up in the second part of 
EPM  (namely,  §§ 48-63) to show that one can avoid the Myth of the Given while still  
claiming  that  mental  events  (such  as  thoughts  and  sensory  impressions7)  should  be 
conceived  of  as  inner  episodes  that  are  knowable  non-inferentially.  Sellars’  thought  
experiment can be summarized as follows: 
(a) Imagine human ancestors who think, act, have a language and communicate but 
lack  our  concept  of  a  thought  (as  an  inner  episode).  Since  they  master  a  
behaviouristic psychology (namely, they have an episodic concept of thought, that 
6 Strictly speaking, § 60 is the beginning of the second part of the myth of Jones, that is, the part concerning sensory 
impressions (as inner objects). Yet, the point is that, before taking sensations into account, Sellars reminds the reader 
that the philosophical promissory note endorsed in § 16 has been finally delivered on.
7 Though Sellars in EPM deals with both thoughts and sensory impressions, for this paper's concern I shall just focus on 
the case of thoughts.
is, thoughts as utterances, as well as a dispositional concept of thought, that is,  
thoughts as dispositions to utter something), call them “Ryleans”.
(b) Ryleans are equipped with both the resources of semantic discourse (for example, 
they know how to make semantic assertions of the form “… in L means ---”) and the 
resources of theoretical discourse (that is, they can postulate theoretical entities in 
order to explain observational phenomena).
(c) There is a genius in the community, call him “Jones”, who finds it mysterious that  
people appear  to act  intelligently not  only while speaking but  even when silent.  
Jones  explains  the  mystery  by  postulating  unobservable  entities,  call  them 
“thoughts”, which are conceived on the model of verbal episodes (for example, both 
have semantic properties) and, in certain circumstances, can generate intelligent 
behaviour (verbal or silent).
(d) Jones teaches his compatriots the theory of thoughts, so that they learn to interpret  
other  people's  and  their  own  behaviour  in  terms  of  the  theoretical  concept  of 
thought.
(e) Our Rylean ancestors are then trained reliably to report the occurrences of their 
own thoughts, without the need to observe overt behaviour any more (so that they 
eventually acquire the same mentalistic concept of thought as we have)8.
Now, according to McDowell (2010: 131) only at the end of (the first part of) the 
myth of Jones (that is, in EPM § 60) Sellars delivers on the promissory note he endorsed 
in EPM § 16. There Sellars reminds us
that among the inner episodes which belong to the framework of thoughts will be 
perceptions, that is to say, seeing that the table is brown, hearing that the piano is 
out  of  tune,  etc.  Until  Jones introduced this  framework,  the  only  concepts  our 
fictitious ancestors had of perceptual episodes were those of overt verbal reports, 
made, for example, in the context of looking at an object in standard conditions. 
Seeing that  something is  the case is  an inner  episode in  the Jonesean theory 
which has as its model reporting on looking that something is the case. It will be 
remembered from an earlier section that just as when I say that Dick reported that 
the table is green, I commit myself to the truth of what he reported, so to say of  
Dick that he saw that the table is green is, in part, to ascribe to Dick the idea 'this 
table is green' and to endorse this idea. The reader might refer back to Sections 16 
ff. for an elaboration of this point.
8 Here two different issues are intertwined: the semantic issue concerned with the Ryleans’ acquiring and mastering a 
concept of thought and the epistemological issue concerned with their right to claim knowledge of thoughts. In the myth 
of Jones, however, our Rylean ancestors acquire the same concept of thought as we have only when (after training and 
conditioning) they become able to know their own thoughts non-inferentially.
To better understand Sellars’ referring back to § 16, it is worth noting that one’s non-
inferential  knowledge  of  one’s  perceptual  experience  that-p  is  expressed  not  only  by 
observation reports such as (1) (where the role of experience is somewhat concealed) or  
by looks-statements such as (2) (where one might be tempted to conceive experiences as 
mere appearances),  but also by  first  person perceptual  statements  such as (3) (which 
commit the speaker to the truth of “this is green”).
(3) I see that this is green.
Sentence (3)  has two  readings,  one dispositional  and one episodic,9 which  are 
connected as follows: to see that-p (in the dispositional  sense) amounts to having the 
disposition to have seeing-episodes that-p. Now, Sellars regards an episodic seeing that-p 
(for example, my now seeing  that this is green) as a paradigmatic case of perceptual 
experience,  and  perceptual  knowledge  of  such  episodic  experiences,  expressed  by 
statements such as (3), as a paradigmatic case of non-inferential knowledge.
Now we are in a better position to understand why McDowell believes that in EPM 
the myth of Jones is an essential ingredient in the rejection of TE10, the foundationalist 
view  according  to  which  one’s  non-inferential  knowledge  of  one’s  own  perceptual 
experiences is epistemically independent. To this end we have to recall that, for McDowell, 
Sellars'  goal  (as  a  non-traditional  or  reformed  empiricist)  is  to  give  an  account  of 
perceptual  statements  such  as  (3)  as  statements  that  express one’s  non-inferential 
knowledge  of  one’s  own  propositionally  contentful  perceptual  experiences11.  More 
precisely,  for McDowell,  Sellars'  point  against  TE  is  that,  since  such  perceptual 
experiences  contain  propositional  claims,  non-inferential  knowledge  of  one’s  own 
perceptual experiences cannot be epistemically independent (for, generally speaking, it is 
impossible to have knowledge of something propositionally contentful independently of any 
other knowledge). Thus, in McDowell's view it is an essential ingredient of Sellars' attack 
on  TE  to  clarify  and  justify  how  it  is  possible  that  perceptual  experiences  contain 
propositional claims. Hence the promissory-notish character of § 16. Now, according to 
McDowell,  Sellars  regards  the  myth  of  Jones  as  delivering  on  the  promissory  note 
endorsed in  EPM  § 16.  What is  the evidence for  McDowell's  interpretation? First,  the 
9See, for example, Sellars (1969: 104) and also Rosenberg (2004b; 2007: 176-7). On Mcdowell's attitude toward pre-
Jonesean Ryleans, see section VIII below.
10 I would like to thank an anonimous referee for pressing me on this point.
11  According to McDowell, such an account, as Sellars’ referring back (in EPM § 60) to § 16 seems to suggest, also 
applies to the conception of experience required by the analysis of looks-statements such as (2).
reference to § 16 in § 60 of EPM. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the fact that in 
EPM only the myth of Jones gives an account of statements such as (3) (where the verb  
“to see” is interpreted in its episodic sense,  as opposed to its  dispositional  sense) by  
showing how to conceive of perceptual experiences as containing propositional claims. 
The basic idea is that verbal episodes are endowed with semantic properties. In particular,  
they are  propositionally contentful.  As is  well  known,  Sellars has a story to  tell  about  
propositional  contentfulness  of  verbal or  linguistic  episodes  (as  opposed  to  inner 
episodes)12. In the myth of Jones, however, he considers the semantic properties of verbal  
episodes  as  something  that  requires  no  further  explanation,  that  is,  as  a  sort  of 
“unexplained  explainer”.  Then  Sellars  tells  us  that  the  genius  Jones  introduces  the 
theoretical concept of a thought on the model of verbal episodes (see stage (c) of my 
reconstruction above). In particular, Jonesean thoughts have in common with their model  
the (semantic) property of containing propositional claims. Moreover, Jonesean thoughts 
include perceptual experiences as a special case. Last, but not least, the former Ryleans' 
knowledge of their episodic thoughts (including perceptual experiences) is non-inferential,  
for they are trained directly to know their own thoughts (see stages (d) and (e) of my 
reconstruction above)13. Ultimately, that's why McDowell believes that the myth of Jones is 
an essential ingredient in the rejection of the Myth of the Given: Sellars' own myth shows 
how  non-inferentially  known experiences  (as  special  cases  of  thoughts)  can  contain 
propositional  claims;  but  nothing  propositionally  structured  can  be  epistemically 
independent;  hence,  our  non-inferentially  known  experiences  cannot  be  epistemically 
independent either, so that TE must be false.
To sum up, against B(ii) McDowell puts forward the following claim: 
McD(ii): in the first half of EPM Sellars’ account of looks-statements such as (2), let alone 
his account of observation reports such as (1), is not sufficient to support either 
the conclusion of ATE or Sellars’ reformed empiricism. For only in EPM § 60, at 
the end of  the first  phase of  the myth of  Jones (that  is,  the part  concerning 
thoughts, including perceptual experiences) Sellars delivers on the promissory 
note endorsed in EPM § 16 (by accounting for first-person perceptual statements 
such as (3)).
12 See, for example, EPM §§ 30-31, but also Sellars (1953; 1954; 1969; 1974). On this issue see also Tripodi (2011).
13  See also EPM § 38.
V. McDowell on chicken-sexers
According  to  McDowell,  besides  exegetical  errors  B(i)  and  B(ii)  Brandom  also 
makes  a  philosophical  error;  for  Brandom  not  only  ascribes  the  two-ply  account  of 
observation reports and looks-statements to Sellars, but he subscribes to it. By the same 
token, McDowell not only criticizes Brandom's attributing the two-ply account of perception 
to  Sellars,  but  he  thinks  that  such  an  account  is  based  on  serious  conceptual 
misunderstandings.
McDowell  (2010:  129)  considers  “the  chicken-sexers  of  epistemological  folklore. 
The chicks they pronounce to be male, getting it right with sufficient frequency for their 
pronouncements to count as knowledgeable, do not look, or smell, or in any other sensory 
modality appear any different to them from the chicks they knowledgeably pronounce to be 
female”. Such people, confronted with a chick, find themselves inclined to say “male”  or 
“female”. But they account for the inclination only “from outside”, for example, as the result 
of  an acquired disposition to  respond to the presence of chicks with  such utterances. 
McDowell (2010: 140) contrasts a chicken-sexer with a person who knows that something 
is  green by seeing that  it  is.  Prima facie,  such a person has an inclination reliably to 
respond to the presence of green objects.  And her inclination is intelligible to her in a  
similar way as a chicken-sexer’s inclinations are intelligible to him: they both know that 
they have acquired some differential dispositions reliably to respond to the presence of  
certain  things.  The  chicken-sexer,  however,  has  only  “external”  reasons  to  follow  his 
inclinations,  while  the  person  who  sees  that  something  is  green  have  also  “internal” 
reasons,  namely,  the thing's  being green:  she is  aware of  that,  for  the green thing is  
sensibly present to her.
Strictly speaking, the chicken-sexers of epistemological folklore do not exist.  For 
example, Pylyshyn (1999: 358-9) has shown that the real chicken-sexers, as much as the 
experts in other fields, quickly make inferences from observational features of which they 
are a little aware. Moreover, one does not become a chicken-sexer by drill or conditioning, 
but rather by being given examples and explicit instructions. McDowell, however, is just  
making a conceptual point. Accordingly, it does not matter whether his description of the 
chicken-sexers “is true of any actual capacity to sort chicks into male and female; it is 
enough that it could be true” (2010: 129).
McDowell’s ultimate point is the following: the person who sees something green is 
in a position to have  observational  knowledge, whereas the chicken-sexers’ knowledge 
isn’t  non-inferential,  let  alone observational.  On Brandom’s  two-ply view,  however,  the 
chicken sexers’ knowledge is a paradigmatic case of non-inferential knowledge. According 
to  McDowell  (2010:  141),  this  undermines  Brandom’s  view.  Brandom  distinguishes 
inferential from non-inferential knowledge according to whether or not a knower reaches a 
bit  of  knowledge  by  inference.  According  to  McDowell  (2010:  141),  however,  such  a 
definition  is  just  psychologically  significant,  whereas  it  should  be  epistemologically  
significant. In McDowell’s words, the distinction “should concern the character of a state 
credentials, not the process by which it was arrived at” (2010: 141).
Consequently, McDowell (2010: 141) provides an alternative definition: “knowledge 
is inferential if the only way to vindicate its status as knowledge is to invoke the goodness 
of  an  inference  to  what  is  known  from  something  independently  within  the  knower’s 
epistemic  reach”  (for  example,  one's  reason  for  that  something  is  that  one  sees  it).  
According to McDowell, the chicken-sexers’ don’t infer their claims about chicks from their 
acquired  tendencies  to  make  them.  So  their  claims  are  non-inferential  in  Brandom’s 
psychological sense. Yet, they are inferential in the epistemological sense. By the same 
token, if Brandom’s two-ply account of non-inferential  knowledge were true, knowledge 
expressed by observation reports such as (1) or by first-person perceptual  statements 
such as (3) would be epistemologically inferential. According to McDowell, this provides a 
sort of reduction ad absurdum of Brandom’s view, for knowledge expressed by statements 
such as (1) or (3) is a paradigmatic case of (epistemologically) non-inferential knowledge.  
On the one hand, a RDRD gives no justification (hence, no knowledge) at all; at best, it is  
psychologically direct. On the other hand, the inferential capacity of giving and asking for  
reasons is not direct at all (either epistemologically or psychologically)14.
As  I  have  said  above,  in  this  paper  I  won’t  take  part  in  the  overall  theoretical  
controversy  between  Brandom  and  McDowell.  Rather,  in  the  next  section  I  will  take 
Brandom's exegetical side once in a while, namely, I will provide a somewhat Brandomian 
exegesis of the myth of Jones. Then in section VII I will show that, McDowell’s criticism 
(assuming, for the sake of argument, that it works) doesn't applies  only to Brandom’s two-
ply account  of  observation,  but  also  to  Sellars’ two-ply account  of  non-inferential  self-
knowledge in the dénouement of the myth of Jones (as I reconstruct it in section VI).
14  McDowell (2010) seems to think that in Brandom’s two-ply account there is room for only one kind of justification, 
that is, inferential justification. Perhaps McDowell forgets Brandom’s (1994: 176-8) talk of a justification “by default”, 
which seems not to be “inferential” in McDowell’s sense.
VI. Where Brandom is right and McDowell goes wrong
Brandom (2002: 524) puts forward a further exegetical claim, according to which the 
two-ply account of observation reports is the “master idea” of EPM, for two further crucial 
issues of  EPM rest on it: one's acquisition of empirical concepts (of which, according to 
Brandom (2002: 359-62), Sellars gives a “rationalistic” account), on the one hand, and the 
problem of how theoretical concepts can come to have observational uses, on the other 
hand15. In what follows, I shall be concerned only with the latter issue, which Sellars deals 
with in the so-called dénouement of the myth of Jones (EPM § 59).
Thus, for this paper’s concern Brandom's third exegetical claim is the following:
B(iii): Sellars relies on the two-ply account of non-inferential knowledge in, among other 
places,  EPM § 59, that is, in accounting for the former Ryleans' acquisition of the 
capacity to know their own thoughts non-inferentially. 
Once again, McDowell rejects Brandom's exegesis. For according to McDowell “the 
idea that  the  outputs  of  some responsive  dispositions  are  constituted  as  conceptually 
contentful by inferential articulation is not relevant to any point Sellars has occasion to 
make in this part [that is, in part III, §§ 10-20]. Or, I believe, anywhere in EPM”, including 
the myth of Jones (2009a: 230; 2010: 136). Thus, McDowell sets up the following claim 
against B(iii):
McD(iii):  Brandom's  Sellars’ two-ply account  does not  occur  in  the  myth  of  Jones (or 
anywhere in EPM).
In  what  follows,  however,  I  shall  show  that,  as  far  as  the  myth  of  Jones  is 
concerned, McD(iii)  is not well-documented (in fact,  it  is false),  while B(iii)  is,  in broad 
outline, true. Let me quote EPM § 59 extensively (a passage corresponding to stages (d) 
and (e) of my reconstruction above):
Once our  fictitious ancestor,  Jones,  has developed the theory that  overt  verbal 
behavior is the expression of thoughts, and taught his compatriots to make use of 
the theory in interpreting each other's behavior, it is but a short step to the use of  
this language in self-description. Thus, when Tom, watching Dick, has behavioral 
evidence which warrants the use of the sentence (in the language of the theory) … 
15 See Brandom (2002: 362-4).
"Dick is thinking that-p", Dick, using the same behavioral evidence, can say, in the 
language of the theory, (…) "I am thinking that-p." And it now turns out – need it  
have? – that Dick can be trained to give reasonably reliable self-descriptions, using 
the language of the theory, without having to observe his overt behavior. Jones 
brings this about, roughly by applauding utterances by Dick of "I am thinking that-p"  
when the behavioral evidence strongly supports the theoretical statement "Dick is 
thinking that-p"; and by frowning on utterances of "I am thinking that-p", when the 
evidence does not support this theoretical statement. Our ancestors begin to speak 
of the privileged access each of us has to his own thoughts.  What began as a 
language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role.
What kind of training is Dick's? According to Sellars (1961b), it consists in “acquiring 
a tendency (ceteris paribus) to respond to his thought that-p by saying 'I am thinking that-
p'”.  The  word  “respond”,  here,  is  being  used  as  a  technical  term  borrowed  from the 
Skinnerian theory of learning: thanks to Jones's applauding (a positive reinforcement) and 
frowning  (a  negative  reinforcement)  to  his  utterances,  Dick  becomes  conditioned  to 
behave in a certain way16. 
According  to  the  view  Sellars  gave  to  Hector-Neri  Castañeda  in  their 
correspondence (henceforth, Sellars 1961b), however, after training Dick becomes able to  
non-inferentially know his own thought that-p if 
(α)  Dick  becomes  conditioned  to  respond  to  the  occurrence  of  the  thought  that-p  by 
uttering “I am thinking that-p”
&
(β) such a “conditioning is itself caught up in a conceptual framework”17.
Now, Sellars (1961b; 1965) makes it clear that, on closer inspection, claim (α) is  
false, while claim (β) is too concise. Consider (α). It suggests that we (actual speakers and 
thinkers) are like one (Dick) who is conditioned to utter “I'm thinking that-p” whenever he 
has  the  thought  that-p.  This  is  clearly  plethoric.  That's  why  Sellars  introduces  a 
16 Strictly speaking, one relatum of the conditioning relation Sellars is talking about is a theoretical entity (i.e. Dick's 
thought  that-p).  Moreover,  the  expression  “`conditioned  response'  is  (...)  most  frequently  used  [by  American 
psychologists in the Skinnerian tradition] in such a way that the overt is conditioned to the overt” (Sellars 1961b). Thus,  
one might substitute such an expression with the more neutral expression “associative connection”, which refers to some 
similarly contingent and non-rational relation. However, this is mainly a terminological point.
17Sellars (1961b) writes: “The important difference between a person who has merely been conditioned to respond to 
his  thought  that-p  by saying  'I  have the thought  that-p'  and  a person whose statement  'I  have the  thought  that-p' 
expresses direct self-knowledge is not that in the latter case the statement isn't occurring as a conditioned response. It 
is. The difference is that in the latter case the conditioning is itself caught up in a conceptual framework”.
modification  in  the  scenario  depicted  in  the  dénouement, by  suggesting  that  strictly 
speaking the latter relatum of the conditioning connection (the former being Dick’s thought 
that-p) is not the  utterance  “I  am thinking that-p”,  but rather the  meta-thought  ・ I  am 
thinking that-p・18 (henceforth MT).
Notice that when he was a mere Rylean, Dick already had thoughts. But only after 
having learned the theory of thoughts and having been trained by Jones Dick becomes 
conditioned  to  respond  to  the  occurrence  of  his  thought  that-p  by MT,  which  he  can 
(though he is not compelled to) express by the utterance “I am thinking that-p”.  Thus, 
according to Sellars (1961b; 1965) (α) is best replaced with
(α)* Dick is conditioned to respond to the occurrence of his thought that-p by having MT.
Now,  consider  (β).  What  does  the  expression  “conceptual  framework”  refer  to 
there? The inferential resources Dick is equipped with, and thanks to which Dick is able to  
justify his MT. According to Sellars (1961b; 1965), Dick's epistemic attitudes towards MT 
are (basically) the following:
(β)* Dick acknowledges that MT asserts the occurrence of his thought that-p, that it might  
be overtly expressed by the utterance “I am thinking that-p”, and that it is a reliable 
symptom of the occurrence of the thought that-p.  
Sellars (1961b; 1965) regards conditions (α)* and (β)* as sufficient for Dick's direct 
(that is, non-inferential) knowledge of his thought that-p. The former, (α)*, accounts for the 
directness of Dick's knowledge, while the latter, (β)*, accounts for the epistemic nature of 
Dick's response.
Now,  it  seems  to  me  that  such  an  account  of  non-inferential  self-knowledge 
straightforwardly resembles Brandom's Sellars’ two-ply account of observation reports. On 
the one hand, both (α) and (α)* are based on RDRDs (though perhaps only the former is 
based on a behavioural RDRD). On the other hand, both the generic (β) and its explication 
(β)* ultimately refer to Dick's inferential capacity to position himself in the game of giving 
and asking for reasons. Therefore McD(iii) is wrong while B(iii) is right.
An analogy discussed by Sellars (1961b) might give rise to the following objection19. 
According to Sellars (1961b), Dick's case is analogue to the case of “a blind man who has 
18 For Sellars' use of dot-quotes, see e.g. Sellars (1953), Sellars (1969), Sellars (1974).
19 I would like to thank an anonimous referee for drawing my attention to this point.
learned the language of colored physical objects and the seeing of them”:  for example, 
such a man knows that red (whatever it is) appears darker (whatever  that means) than 
yellow (whatever it is); that yellow is the colour of this lemon while red is the colour of this  
flag; and other things of the sort. Then he “has his visual apparatus put in order and shortly 
thereafter is able to see that we have a case in which language, already meaningfully 
used, acquired a 'reporting role' expressive of direct, non-inferential knowledge which it did 
not, for that person, have before”: for example, he now looks at this lemon and this flag 
and has, for the first time, the perceptual experiences of colours, especially of this red and 
this yellow, of this red being darker than this yellow, and so on and so forth. The point of 
Sellars' analogy, one might argue, is not that Dick's non-inferential knowledge of his own 
thoughts has two components,  namely,  an RDRD and the ability to use the Jonesean 
conceptual apparatus, but simply that the conditioning leads Dick, who already learnt the 
Joneasean language of thoughts, to have experiences of his own thoughts. Thus, one 
might conclude, in either cases the two-ply description does not seem to apply.
Let me briefly reply to this objection. On the one hand I agree, at least prima facie, 
that the two-ply description doesn't apply to the blind man's case. In fact, in this case 
Sellars  is  just  concerned  with  the  second component  of  a  two-ply  account  of  non-
inferential knowledge, namely, the inferential ability to master a conceptual framework: the 
general point of his analogy is to show that, as one (a blind man) cannot learn, properly 
speaking, to  see  coloured  objects  unless  one  has already  acquired  the  conceptual 
framework  of  colour-perception,  so  one  (a  Rylean)  cannot  come,  as  it  were,  to  have 
experiences of his own thoughts unless one has already acquired the Jonesean theoretical 
framework. So far, so good. On the other hand, however, what does it mean that that man 
“has his visual apparatus put in order”? It seems to me that, if we want to keep the analogy 
between the blind man's case and the case of Dick, that locution doesn't mean, strictly 
speaking, that that man acquired the ability to see (or to have perceptual experiences of) 
colours, but rather that he acquired the ability to reliably respond to coloured objects. His 
ability  to  see (or  to  have  experiences  of)  colours  is  rather  the  further  result  of  the 
combination of two abilities: his just-acquired ability to reliably respond to coloured objects 
(an RDRD) and his old ability to master the conceptual framework of colour-perception (an 
inferential capacity). Thus, the two-ply description does seem to apply once again.
In the next section I will show that, assuming McDowell’s epistemological definition 
of  “inferential  knowledge”,  as  well  as  his  distinction  between  epistemologically  and 
psychologically non-inferential  pieces of knowledge, and granting – for the sake of the 
argument  –  that  McDowell’s  criticism  of  Brandom’s  two-ply  account  of  non-inferential 
reports is successful,  Sellars’ two-ply account of  non-inferential  self-knowledge fails on 
McDowell’s own terms.
VII. The myth of Jones as an invalid argument
The myth of Jones might be conceived of as the following argument20. If one has the 
epistemic resources that  the Ryleans have at stages (a) and (b) of  the myth  and if  it 
happens to one what happens to the Ryleans at stages (c), (d) and (e), then one has (in 
sufficiently relevant respects) the same non-inferential knowledge of one's own thoughts 
as we (actual, non-fictitious people) have. In what follows, I shall argue that, assuming 
McDowell's epistemological point of view, such an argument is not valid, for the conclusion 
does not follow from the two premises. Namely, given the premises, it is false that at the  
end of the story the former Rylean Dick has (acquired) the same ability to non-inferentially 
know one’s own thoughts as we have. In other words, the myth of Jones doesn’t fit with 
McDowell’s epistemological view of non-inferential knowledge. Very briefly, the point is that 
everything McDowell says about the chicken-sexers is also true of the (former) Ryleans21. 
More precisely, if one assumes McDowell’s view on non-inferential knowledge, one 
should acknowledge that at the end of the myth the former Ryleans have not become 
sufficiently like us. Their utterance “I am thinking that-p” (based on the Jonesean theory)  
and  our  own  utterance  “I  am  thinking  that-p”  (based  on  our  actual  self-knowledge) 
correspond to different grounds or reasons. The former ultimately expresses inferential  
knowledge,  while  the  latter  expresses  non-inferential  knowledge  (in  McDowell's 
epistemological sense). That’s why Sellars’ account of self-knowledge in the dénouement  
of the myth of Jones fails on McDowell’s own terms.
Let me further elaborate on this point. If one asks “What right does Dick have to 
have his meta-thought?”, the answer will refer to the reliability of the conditioned response 
to thoughts with meta-thoughts,  as well  as to the justification of the involved theory of 
mind, that is, the Jonesean theory of thoughts22. On the one hand, Dick knows that his 
20 For a more detailed discussion of the myth of Jones as an invalid argument see Tripodi (2011), where I try to show 
that  the myth of Jones doesn't work independently of McDowell's reconstruction. For different kinds of criticism, see 
Marras (1973a, 1973b, 1977) and Triplett and deVries (2006).
21 In his reply to McDowell (2010), Brandom (2010: 323) underlines a similar point. His overall argument, however, is 
different from mine (according to Brandom, McDowell simply finds the pre-Jonesean scenario unintelligible), and in what 
follows I won’t focus on it.
22 Prima facie, this might strike one as non-Sellarsian. For Sellars often insists that in the case of our ordinary non-
inferential  first-person  ascriptions  'the  way  the  thought  occurred  to  us'  will  be  sufficient  for  the  justification  of  the 
(occurrence of our) thought. This is true, however, only of statements that already have a reporting role. But the question 
is whether, in the post-Jonesean and post-conditioning scenario of the myth of Jones, the former Ryleans' first-person 
statements have acquired a reporting role in the same sense. My point in this section is that they have not, at least if we 
meta-thought is a reliable symptom of the occurrence of the thought that-p, and more 
precisely that – given the occurrence of the thought that-p – he has been conditioned to 
have the meta-thought (that is, he cannot help having it). On the other hand, Dick knows 
that his own intelligent behavior (not only verbal but even silent) should be explained in  
Jonesean terms, that is, by attributing certain thoughts to himself. Thus, Dick's justification 
for his meta-thought ultimately relies on behavioral evidence. First, Jones is presented by 
Sellars  (EPM  §  53)  as  “an  unsung  forerunner  of  the  movement  in  psychology,  once 
revolutionary,  now commonplace,  known as Behaviourism”,  conceived as the following 
“methodological thesis”: 
Methodological Behaviourism (MB): Scientific psychologists are allowed to accept only one 
kind of evidence, that is, any evidential data consisting of or derived from overt 
public behaviour. 
Secondly,  Dick’s  justification  of  his  meta-thought  depends  on  the  theory  of 
conditioning and the Jonesean theory of thought, but both such theories are explicitly built  
in accord with MB. Accordingly, both theories are merely supported by the observation of 
other people’s and one's own overt behavior.
The point is not, however, that Dick's self-knowledge ultimately has the same kind 
of grounds as Skinner’s theory of conditioning and as Jones’s proto-psychological theory 
of thoughts (namely, evidential data consisting of or derived from overt behavior). For it  
also has the same kind of grounds as a more sophisticated theory in cognitive psychology.  
The point  is,  rather,  that  behavioral  grounds are  a  subclass  of  inferential  grounds (in 
McDowell’s epistemological sense). That's why Sellars’ two-ply account of non-inferential 
self-knowledge can be criticized à la McDowell. At the beginning the Rylean Dick (taught 
by Jones) has inferential knowledge of his own thoughts, based on behavioral evidence .  
Later he becomes conditioned suitably to respond to the occurrence of his thoughts, so 
that his knowledge of them becomes psychologically non-inferential. Nonetheless, in virtue 
of  MB  such  knowledge  relies  on  behavioral  grounds,  consequently  it  is  still  
epistemologically inferential.  Therefore,  McDowell  must  acknowledge that Dick has not 
actually  become  sufficiently  like  us,  even  on  McDowell's  own  terms,  because  our 
knowledge of our own thoughts, whatever one might say of its psychological status, is 
assimilate  a  statement's  having  a  reporting  role  with  its  expressing  non-inferential  self-knowledge  in  McDowell's 
epistemological sense: as I will try to show below, the justification of a former Rylean's own thoughts (even after learning 
the Jonesean theory and after being conditioned) turns out to be inferential rather than non-inferential (in McDowell's 
epistemological sense), for it ultimately depends on a theory of thoughts (which postulates thoughts and connects them 
with behaviour) and a theory of conditioning (which guarantees the reliability of one's meta-thoughts).
definitely  non-inferential  epistemologically.  In  fact,  according  to  McDowell  our  non-
inferential self-knowledge is based on non-inferential grounds. For example, what right do I 
have for claiming that this is red? I am seeing it. Similarly, what right do I have to claim that 
I  am thinking that-p? I am having this thought. On the contrary, Dick claims that he is 
thinking that-p merely rest on theoretical, inferential grounds, which include behavioural  
grounds as special cases. Such grounds, however, are deeply different from observational,  
non-inferential ones. Thus, even by McDowell’s own standards the myth of Jones fails. 
Considered as an argument the myth of Jones is not valid, for it  does not succeed in 
proving its conclusion (that is, that at the end of the fictitious story, in the post-Jonesean  
and  post-conditioning  scenario,  Dick  has  become  sufficiently  like  us,  insofar  as  the 
capacity non-inferentially to know one's own thoughts is concerned).
VIII. The failure of McDowell’s Sellars’ attack on TE
The main consequence of the failure of the myth of Jones in EPM is the failure of 
both  McDowell’s  Sellars’  ATE  and  his  reformed  empiricism.  For  a  central  idea  of  
McDowell’s Sellars’ ATE is the notion of non-inferentially knowable experiences containing 
propositional  claims.  But  this  idea  is  ultimately  based  on  the  myth  of  Jones,  which 
(according to McDowell’s interpretation) should justify Sellars’ endorsing the promissory 
note in EPM § 16.
At first glance, the myth of Jones seems to succeed in justifying such a promissory 
way of talking. For the notion of perceptual experiences containing propositional claims 
derives from the genius Jones' attributing by analogy the semantic categories of manifest  
utterances  (that  is,  the  model  of  the  theory)  to  thoughts  (which  include  perceptual 
experiences as special cases). 
On closer inspection, however, it turns out that, on McDowell’s own grounds, the 
myth  of  Jones  does  not  show  that  the  theoretical  notion  of  a  thought  as  containing 
propositional claims can become the very same  non-inferential  notion of thought as we 
have. Consequently, McDowell’s Sellars does not deliver on the promissory note, which 
required justification of the idea that thoughts (that is, those inner episodes that we know 
non-inferentially) can contain propositional claims. Thus, McDowell's Sellars’ myth does 
not “kill” the empiricist form of the Myth of the Given, and neither ATE nor McDowell’s 
Sellars' reformed empiricism are justified.
Prima facie, McDowell’s error is the following: first, he doesn’t realize that in the 
dénouement of the myth of Jones Sellars ultimately puts forward a somewhat Brandomian 
two-ply account of self-knowledge; secondly, and more importantly, he doesn't realize that,  
insofar as he argues against the attribution of non-inferential knowledge to the chicken-
sexers  of  epistemological  folklore,  he must  contest  (rather  than endorse)  Sellars'  own 
myth, especially its dénouement (that is, § 59).
More generally, McDowell reads the myth of Jones as if the  dénouement  did not 
belong to it. McDowell reminds us that “when Jones starts work, his fellows already have 
the subjunctive conditional, hence the ability to speak of overt linguistic behaviour with its  
semantical  character”  (McDowell  2010:  133).  Moreover,  McDowell  thinks  that  Sellars 
cannot fulfil his major aim (that is, to dismantle traditional empiricism) unless he follows 
“Jones in going decisively beyond those pre-Jonesian resources. Only after the first phase 
of Jones’s conceptual innovation does Sellars in effect declare that he has discharged his 
promissory note (§ 60)” (McDowell 2010: 133). 
This reading of the myth of Jones has a manifest advantage: it allows McDowell to 
criticize Brandom's exegesis. But it has also a disadvantage, upon which I have tried to 
cast some light in this paper, and which I would like to stress a bit further in what follows.  
On the one hand, McDowell scores a goal against Brandom: Brandom’s two ply account of  
looks statements is in terms of dispositions (which can be inhibited) to make linguistic 
claims such as (2);  but as McDowell  underlines, “this apparatus is all  available before 
Jones’s innovation”. Thus, “in implying that his apparatus suffices for Sellars’ aims in Part  
III, Brandom precludes himself from properly registering the promissory character Sellars 
stresses in his moves there” (McDowell 2009a: 227). 
On the other hand, however, McDowell misconstrues Jones’ innovation. Such an 
innovation  comes  in  two  steps  (rather  than  only  one).  The  former,  which  McDowell  
acknowledges, is a conceptual innovation, that is, the introduction of a conception of inner 
episodes on the model of linguistic episodes. The latter, which McDowell forgets about, is 
the training of the former Ryleans (such as Dick) non-inferentially to know their own inner  
episodes.  The  first  step  accounts  for  our  characterizing  inner  episodes  as  containing 
propositional  claims.  The  latter  step  accounts  for  the  non-inferential  character  of  our 
knowledge of such episodes. Thus, if McDowell had accurately described the role of the 
myth of Jones in EPM, Sellars would have delivered on the promissory note at most at the 
end of § 58, rather than, as he actually does, at the beginning of § 60. For § 59 would have 
had no role to play in delivering on the promissory note endorsed in § 16.
McDowell,  however,  has  misconceived the  role  of  Sellars’ own myth.  For  pace 
McDowell  the  dénouement  seems to  be an integral  part  of  the delivering.  Indeed,  the 
promissory  talk  does  concern  the  notion  of  non-inferentially  knowable  experiences 
containing propositional claims. As I have shown, however, the dénouement accounts for 
the idea that perceptual experiences can contain propositional claims only at the price of  
making such experiences inferentially rather than non-inferentially knowable (assuming the 
very  epistemological  distinction  between  inferential  and  non-inferential  provided  by 
McDowell).
Thus, on my view, unless McDowell's Sellars provides an alternative way to deliver 
on Sellars’ promissory note in EPM, that is, unless McDowell provides an alternative and 
persuasive reading of (the dénouement of) the myth of Jones, McDowell’s Sellars does not 
succeed in challenging traditional empiricism.
IX. McDowell's Sellars and Wilfrid Sellars
In  this  paper  I  don't  claim  that  one  cannot  vindicate  ATE,  let  alone  that 
foundationalism is true, but only that one cannot vindicate ATE the way McDowell’s Sellars 
tries to do it in EPM, that is, via the myth of Jones. According to McDowell, Sellars cannot 
justify a crucial premise of ATE (namely, the idea that one non-inferentially knows one’s 
own  propositionally  contentful  perceptual  experiences)  unless  he  delivers  on  the 
promissory note he endorsed in  EPM § 16 (namely, unless he provides a more detailed 
picture of experience). McDowell thinks that Sellars delivers on the promissory note in the 
myth of Jones. But Sellars’ own myth fails on McDowell’s own grounds. Now, suppose one 
grants all this. Yet, the fact that the argument based on the myth of Jones fails, at best  
shows  that  McDowell’s  Sellars’  view  that  perception  has  propositional  content  is  not 
justified; whereas it does not show that it is wrong. Perhaps McDowell or even Sellars in 
EPM  can justify that claim in a different way. Generally speaking, the failure of Sellars’ 
thought  experiment  (at  least  on  McDowell’s  grounds)  puts  in  question  not  so  much 
McDowell's own philosophical views (about which I have explicitly said almost nothing in 
this paper), but rather his interpretation of Sellars’ argument against traditional empiricism. 
By the same token, it is important not to confuse McDowell’s Sellars with the real Wilfrid 
Sellars. In what follows, I will list and highlight some differences between them, in order to  
make it clearer what is the scope of this paper's main argument.
First of all, Sellars does not think that his main argument in  EPM is  only directed 
against those who think that foundational knowledge is “subjective” (i.e., it is knowledge of 
perceptual experience rather than of medium-sized physical objects). Rather, he conceives 
of it as directed against "the whole framework of givenness" (EPM § 1). Thus, McDowell’s 
Sellars’ ATE has a narrower scope than the real Sellars’ argument against the Myth of the  
Given.
Secondly,  let  us  grant  that  both  McDowell  and  Sellars  agree  that  observation 
reports  such as (1)  and first-person perceptual  statements such as (3)  are somewhat 
grounded on perceptual experiences (though according to their non-traditional empiricism 
such experiences cannot be epistemically independent,  qua propositionally contentful). It 
is controversial,  however, what the problematic expression “grounded on” means here.  
Such an expression often means the same as “justified by”, and that is just what McDowell 
means.  But  Sellars'  view  is  more  multifaceted.  On  the  one  hand,  according  to  him 
observation reports express aspects of perceptual experiences. And, at least prima facie, 
the expressing relation does not seem to be the same as a grounding, justification relation. 
On  the  other  hand,  on  his  view  there  is  something  distinguishable  from  perceptual 
experience, namely sense impressions, but perceptual reports are not justified by sense 
impressions,  although  in  a  different  sense  they  are  grounded  on  them:  such  reports 
express experiences, which are caused (but not justified) by such impressions23.
Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, both McDowell and Sellars have a notion of 
epistemologically non-inferentially justified claim, and both of them think that such a notion 
ought to play a role in understanding our knowledge. But it is highly controversial whether  
or not Sellars' notion and McDowell's notion are one and the same. On the one hand, it  
seems that Sellars agrees with McDowell in regarding the inferential/non-inferential divide 
as an epistemological distinction. For example, Sellars (1961a: 121) suggests that though 
–  from an  ontological  point  of  view –  theoretical  entities  exist  in  the  same sense  as  
observational entities, from an epistemological point of view a theoretical justification is 
completely  different  from  an  observational  one:  for  example,  I  believe  on  inferential 
grounds that a certain gas will obey the Boyle-Charles law or even that tomorrow the sun  
will rise, whereas I believe that this is red on non-inferential grounds. (Notice, by the way, 
that here the ambiguous notion of a ground occurs again). Perhaps one might even think 
that  this  view  is  compatible  with  McDowell’s  (2010),  according  to  which  theoretical 
justification is inferential (that is, in order to prove something one has to make inferences 
from  something  known  independently),  while  an  observational  justification  is  non-
inferential (that is, one does not have to invoke the validity of an inference in order to prove 
something, as his reason is, for example, that one sees that it is so). On the other hand, 
23 See EPM §§ 60-3.
however, this is surely not the way Sellars would describe things24. For example, Sellars 
(1975: §§ 33-35) considers the case where Jones sees there to be a red apple in front of  
him. According to Sellars, “given that Jones has learned how to use the relevant words in  
perceptual situations, he is justified in reasoning as follows: I  just thought-out-loud 'Lo! 
Here is a red apple'  (no countervailing conditions obtain);  so, there is good reason to 
believe that there is a red apple in front of me” (1975: § 33). Sellars notices that  although 
the justification of the belief that there is a red apple in front of Jones is an inference, it has  
the peculiar character that its essential premise asserts the occurrence of the very same 
belief in a specific context. It is this fact that makes the justified claim non-inferential (1975: 
§ 35). It  is worth noting, however, that on McDowell's definition Jones' claim would be 
inferential, rather  than  non-inferential.  Therefore,  in  Sellars'  view  the  class  of 
epistemologically  non-inferentially  justified  claims  (in  McDowell’s  sense)  seems  to  be 
empty. In fact, one might even wonder whether McDowell’s notion of an epistemologically 
non-inferential piece of knowledge is the infamous notion of the Given, that is, whether 
McDowell ends up trying to squeeze a given back into his system under a different guise. 
This is controversial too. On the one hand, according to McDowell our non-inferential self-
knowledge  is  based  on  non-inferential  grounds  (in  his  epistemological  sense).  For 
example, my right for claiming that this is red is that I see it. Thus, the seeing already 
contains the claim, and to say that the claim is based on the seeing seems to be the same 
as saying that the claim within the seeing is self-justified, a given. On the other hand, 
however, one’s epistemologically non-inferential knowledge of something (in McDowell’s 
sense) is not required to be epistemically independent, indefeasible, and able to provide 
epistemic support for all other knowledge. McDowell’s characterization of non-inferential 
knowledge seems to be compatible with the following ideas: non-inferential  knowledge 
requires  the  capacity  to  make  inferences  (as  well  as  other  semantic  and  epistemic 
capacities);  such non-inferential  knowledge is defeasible (for example, based on either  
theoretical reasons or reliability considerations); such knowledge does not constitute the 
ultimate court of appeal for all other epistemic claims.
In this paper I cannot answer all such controversial questions exhaustively. I hope, 
however,  that  this last  section made it  sufficiently clear  that  one cannot  easily identify 
McDowell’s interpretation of Sellars and the real Wilfrid Sellars. So that, as I have already 
said above, this paper’s ultimate goal is neither to refute McDowell’s own theoretical view 
on perception, nor Sellars’ argument against the Myth of the Given in  EPM,  but rather 
24 See, for example, Sellars’ criticisms of Chisholm’s notion that it can be the case that what justifies my belief that-p is  
the fact that-p in Sellars (1975: § 36).
McDowell’s interpretation and use of that notable authority25.
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